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WILLs-CoNSTRucnoN-UsE OF EX'I'RINSIC EVIDENCE-A suit was brought
for construction of a will bequeathing a sum of money "To the Home for the
Aged located at 2007 N. Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana." A home for
the aged was conducted at that address by Altenheim of Indianapolis, while
Indianapolis Home for the Aged, Inc. was located at 1731 N. Capitol Avenue.
The probate court resolved the contest in favor of Altenheim of Indianapolis,
holding the bequest to be unambiguous. On appeal, held, reversed. Upon
attempted application the bequest was ambiguous and extrinsic evidence was
admissible to interpret the language employed. One judge dissented on the
ground that the will contained no ambiguity. Indianapolis Home for the Aged,
Inc., v. Altenheim of Indianapolis, (Ind. 1950) 93 N.E. (2d) 203.
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In the interpretation of a will the court must place itself in the situation of
the testator by means of evidence of the circumstances in order to identify the
persons and property referred to in the will.1 It is also accepted that the cardinal
principle in interpretation is to seek the testator's intent as expressed in the will
and as aided by extrinsic facts. 2 If the will is contradictory in its description of
the legatee or the property, non-essential and erroneous matter in the description
will be striken out, and, if what remains is sufficient to identify, it will be given
effect.3 The use of direct statements of the testator's intent is allowable only to
explain an equivocation.4 Since the bequest in the principal case can be termed
equivocal,5 it would seem that any type of extrinsic evidence, including direct
statements of the testator's intent, was admissible. The evidence offered6 was
clearly sufficient to show that the testator intended to designate the Indianapolis
Home for the Aged, Inc., and the admission clearly justified to determine what
in fact was the testator's expressed intent.7 The dissent, however, adopted the
old view, contending that the will contained no ambiguity and therefore the
plain meaning could not be disturbed.8 While courts are far from unanimous on
this matter it is believed that the better view is that a plain meaning, if such a
thing exists, can be disturbed; for the older contrary view has been found to be
too narrow and formalistic. 9 Once extrinsic evidence is admitted in the principal
case it becomes clear that the address used by the testator was erroneous and
l WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §526 (1935); In re Loewenbach's Will, 222 Wis. 467, 269
N.W. 323 (1936); McCall v. McCall, 25 S.C. Eq. (4 Rich.) 447, 57 Am. Dec. 733
(1852).
2 Blauvelt v. Citizen's Trust Co., 3 N.J. 545, 71 A. (2d) 184 (1950); Warren,
''Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1936); 94 A.L.R. 26 (1935). The old
view, that no extrinsic evidence could be used to disturb a plain meaning, has been rejected
by modern authorities. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §524 (1935).
3 Warren, "Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1936). BROOM'S LEGAL
MAxlMs, 10th ed., 426 (1939).
4 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE §2472 (1923); 2 PAGE, WILLS §1420 (1926); The phrase
"latent ambiguity" is termed an "unprofitable subtlety'' and the word "equivocation" is
preferred in Warren, "Interpretation of Wills," 49 HARv. 1-,. REv. 697, 707 (1936).
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §529 (1935).
6 The evidence tended to prove that: The testator was acquainted with and interested
in the appellant; the testator was a life member of the appellant; the testator had made a
previous gift to the appellant and expressed an intention to do more for it; the testator had
talked with the scrivener of the will about this provision and that the scrivener was unaware
of any other home for the aged other than the appellant. Principal case at 204.
7 Holmes, "The Theory of Legal Interpretation," 12 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1899);
Peet v. Peet, 229 ill. 341, 82 N.E. 376 (1907); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2470 (1923);
2 PAGE, WILLS §§1418, 1420 (1926).
8 The leading American case which denied the use of extrinsic evidence when the
will was "clear on its face" was Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Society, 48 Mass. 188 (1843).
This proposition was repudiated in England but a strong presumption was said to exist in
favor of the society named in The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v. The Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1915]
A.C. 207.
9 Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917); Northern Trust Co. v.
Perry, 105 Vt. 524, 168 A. 710 (1933); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §2463, notes 4, 5 (1923);
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, 422-26, 471-73, 482 (1898).
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enough remained upon striking the address to express the testator's intent.10
Thus, it would seem that the decision is consistent with modem authorities
though it would perhaps have been better for the court to have couched the
opinion in different terms so as to avoid the unp~fitable distinction between
patent and latent ambiguities.11
John A. Hellstrom, S.Ed.

10 The test for the application of this doctrine is given in Warren, "Interpretation of
Wills," 49 HARv. L. Rsv. 703 (1936) as: The words must be insensible with respect to
the facts; the part disregarded must be a mere trimming; and the remaining portion must
be substantial.
112 PAGE, WILLS §1419 (1926). The distinction is unprofitable and even those courts
which use it tend in practice to let in evidence of circumstances in all cases, though limiting
use of direct statements of the testator's intent to cases of equivocation.

